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On 26 May 1972 the US and the USSR signed
the Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) Treaty con-
cluding what many experts consider to have
been the most significant arms control agree-
ment to date. The ABM Treaty and the 1974
Protocol arrested a rapidly expanding and ex-
pensive defensive arms race by limiting 100
ABMs to one site, and banning their improve-
ment or the development of new systems. This
agreement stabilized the arms competition be-
tween the superpowers in a number of other
ways. By ensuring the vulnerability of each
nation’s defenses and cities to their enemy’s
retaliatory forces, the ABM ban prevented a
renewed offensive missile race and was the
crucial factor in the agreement to place a ceil-
ing on offensive weapons in the SALT I and II
accords. The current hope for substantial arms
reductions has been made possible by an ab-
sence of defensive weapons.
In the ten years since the signing of this
historic agreement there have been some new
developments which threaten not only future
arms control agreements, but also the likeli-
hood of peace. One serious problem is that the
US and USSR are both rapidly developing and
deploying anti-satellite weapons (ASATs).
Even more dangerous than the ASAT competi-
tion is the US and Soviet work on space-based
laser and particle-beam ABM systems. If both
nations continue to develop these weapons they
will greatly increase the possibility of war,
promote instead of reduce the propensity to
build additional offensive weapons, and waste
billions of dollars. With the worldwide interest
in arms control and weapons reduction, and the
restarting of arms control negotiations by the
US and USSR, there exists an opportunity to
ban ASAT weapons and energy-beam ABM
systems.
Description of ASATs and advanced
ABM systems
Anti-satellite weapons are designed to destroy
enemy intelligence, early warning, or com-
munications satellites. There are currently four
basic ASAT systems: orbiting ’satellite
bombs’ , orbiting anti-satellite missiles, ground-
based ASAT missiles and energy-beam
weapons. The USSR was the first to test an
ASAT weapon. In 1977 the Soviets launched a
satellite that could be maneuvered close to a
target satellite and then detonated, destroying
the target by schrapnel. The Soviets have since
tested more advanced versions of this ’satellite
bomb’ and are also thought to be getting ready
a satellite that will be able to launch missiles at
several target satellites. The US has developed
a ground-based ASAT missile that will be fired
from an F-15 fighter. The F-15 will fly high
into the atmosphere where a 2-stage booster
rocket will be fired. The missile will then
home to the target satellite, destroying it upon
impact. Both nations are also working on
space-based beam weapons that would be able
to destroy a satellite from a considerable dis-
tance (discussed in greater detail below).
In addition to developing ASAT capabilities,
the superpowers are also developing ASAT
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counter-measures to enhance the survivability
of satellites. Some of these measures include:
the hardening of satellites to make them more
difficult to destroy by fragments and energy-
beams ; the duplication of vital systems so the
satellite might remain operational even if one
system is damaged; maneuverability enhance-
ment that will allow a satellite to move away
from an approaching satellite or missile; the
development of ASAT missiles for self-de-
fense ; and the deployment of a number of
identical satellites to ensure that some will
survive ASAT attacks.
Beam weapons,
Lasers and particle-beams have many possible
ASAT, counter ASAT, and ABM uses. These
energy-beams have many properties that would
make them a desirable weapon. The beams
have the potential to be very accurate and will
destroy (or damage) their target on contact.
What some defense planners foresee is an
energy beam that will travel at the speed of
light over hundreds of kilometers and destroy
or damage a strategic missile or satellite by
concentrating a large amount of energy on a
small area (similar to what is seen in science
fiction movies). In theory, a laser weapon in
orbit about 1000 km above the earth can de-
stroy strategic missiles in the boost stage. 1
Why ASAT and energy beam ABM
systems are dangerous
The ASAT and advanced ABM weapons
should be banned for a number of reasons.
First, these weapons are inherently destabiliz-
ing ; in other words, in a crisis situation their
existence would tend to make war more likely
to occur. Since both nations depend heavily on
satellites to warn them of an enemy attack,
monitor military movements, and to communi-
cate with their strategic and conventional
forces, the loss of these satellites could blind
them and prevent retaliation. Since both the US
and USSR possess the capability to destroy
each other’s land-based strategic forces, the
nation that attacks first, theoretically, can gain
an important advantage in damage limitation
and is in a better position to negotiate an end to
the war. The feared or actual destruction of a
nation’s early warning, intelligence, and com-
mand-control and communications (C3) satel-
lites in a crisis could cause its leaders to order
an escalation of the level of military activity
(which could trigger an escalatory cycle ending
in war), or it could convince these leaders that
war was imminent and cause them to launch a
preemptive strike. Second, future arms control
agreements will depend on intelligence satel-
lites to verify compliance with the agreement.
The possibility that a nation’s verification
capability will be disrupted might make the
superpowers more reluctant to reach arms con-
trol agreements.
In theory, the existence of an ABM system
will reduce the damage an enemy can inflict. A
system capable of defending an entire nation,
such as an energy beam system, will make
land-based ICBMs and other strategic forces
less vulnerable to a counterforce strike, and
will limit the retaliatory damage inflicted on
cities. In a crisis, a nation’s leaders fearing the
loss of their ICBMs, C3, and other strategic
forces to an enemy counterforce strike and
questioning their ability to retaliate, might de-
cide to preempt hoping that their own ABM
system would limit damage enough to make
the war ’winnable’. In addition to making war
more likely, the deployment of ABM systems
would rule out any further strategic arms con-
trol agreements. If the US and USSR cannot be
certain they will be able to inflict intolerable
damage on their enemy, they will not agree to
limit arms. Instead, the deployment of ad-
vanced ABM systems would stimulate an of-
fensive and defensive arms race.
Effectiveness and expense
One of the factors that contributed to the ban of
current ABM systems was their questionable
effectiveness in destroying enemy missiles. It
was far easier and much cheaper to produce
additional offensive missiles and effective
countermeasures against any ABM system,
than it was to deploy the ABM system. Some
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experts are again convinced that the same prin-
ciples would hold for the energy beam sys-
tems. There are many large technical and
physical problems a satellite based energy-
beam system would face. The physics of laser
and particle-beam propagation over large dis-
tances make it questionable whether these
beams would be strong or accurate enough to
perform their mission 2. Since these very ex-
pensive satellites would not be in a geosyn-
chronous orbit, because it would put them out
of their projected range, a large number would
be necessary to protect a nation from attack.
Furthermore, each satellite would have to be
capable of tracking and destroying more than
1000 missiles during an eight minute boost
period. This capability is not projected until the
late 1990s or 2lst century.
Even if such a system were feasible, there
are many counter-measures that could protect
the missiles; reflective surfaces, abative coat-
ings, and other materials that could withstand
the beam’s energy could be cheaply used.
Highly maneuverable missiles, stealthy
coatings and designs to limit tracking ability,
chaff, and other jamming measures could be
used to blind the satellite’s tracking system.
The energy beam ABM weapons would also be
ineffective against depressed trajectory mis-
siles, cruise missiles, and bombers. The de-
ployment of satellite based ABM systems
would also make ASAT weapons a certainty.
Thus, an ABM system would have to be capa-
ble of defending itself from attack.
The expense of the ASAT and beam ABM
systems would be staggering. Despite the fact
that energy beam systems are 15 years off, the
Reagan Administration budgeted approxi-
mately 350 million for research in 1982 and
500 million in 1983. While much of the re-
search on high energy beams has possible in-
dustrial and scientific application (such as fu-
sion), much of these expenditures will be
wasted. The US ASAT program, for instance,
will cost approximately 1.5 billion dollars for
research, development, and initial deployment.
Legal questions
The deployment of the ASAT and energy beam
ABM systems also raises a number of legal
questions. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
while banning the placement of nuclear
weapons in space, does not specifically
exclude other military weapons. Nevertheless,
ASAT and ABM weapons in space would
violate the intent of the Treaty and the histori-
cal precedents of space use. A nation is not
supposed to interfere with another’s missions
or property in space; ASAT weapons certainly
violate this principle. Another interesting
question ASAT deployment raises is how as-
tronauts in the US or Soviet space shuttles
would be treated, since a substantial number of
these missions deal with military matters. The
Treaty maintains that ’astronauts shall be re-
garded as envoys of mankind’ . Yet, will their
military role in deploying or servicing ASATs
or ABMs make them fair game for ASATs?
Deployment of ABMs in space may also
violate the 1972 ABM accord. As the Treaty
now stands, an ABM system is defined to
consist of interceptor missiles, launchers, and
ABM radars. Yet, ’in the event ABM systems
based on physical principles and including
components capable of being substituted for
ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers...
are created in the future, specific limitations on
such systems and their components would be
subject to a discussion in accordance with arti-
cle XIII and XIV of the Treaty’. Continuing,
Article V specifically states that each party
undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based,
air-based or space-based. Furthermore, Chief
US Negotiator for the ABM and SALT I ac-
cords, Gerald Smith, maintained that the Nixon
Administration specifically wanted to ban the
deployment of other ABM systems (called
futuristics), but the Soviet military balked.
Nevertheless, Smith maintained that the princi-
ples and intent of the agreement applied to
futuristics as we11.3 3
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Verification aftd accord possibility
The verification of an agreement banning these
weapons is well within the capabilities of both
nations. Space based ABM and advanced
ASAT (ground or space based) will require
extensive testing which can be easily observed.
Although limited ASAT capability exists on
both sides, there is no reason. to believe that
this should prevent an agreement. In 1972 both
the US and USSR possessed ABM capability
and each side was willing to forego further
development and testing; there is no reason that
this could not be the case with ASATs and
energy beam ABMs. There are a number of
precedents for banning tested, deployed, and
untested weapons. In addition to the ABM
Treaty, the Space, the Antarctic, and the Sea-
bed Treaties all have sought, in one form or
another, to prevent the introduction of weapons
into new areas.
The US and USSR were close to an agree-
ment on banning ASATs in 1979, but the
Carter Administration broke off talks when the
USSR invaded Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the
Reagan Administration has not reopened these
talks; apparently Reagan is content to let the
military have their way. The Soviets have since
called for the ban of ASATs and have intro-
duced resolutions to that effect in the UN.
There is no political reason that should prevent
these weapons from being banned. Arms con-
trol treaties, after all, are articles of hope and
faith; it is the desire for a safer and better
future that makes them possible. In addition to
preventing the waste of billions of dollars and
roubles, and reducing dangerous competition
between the superpowers, the banning of
anti-satellite weapons and energy beam anti-
ballistic missile systems will reduce the chance
of war, making a better future possible.
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